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Reflections on the Constitutional Duties of
Citizens (and Persons)
by Peter E. Quint

I. Introduction: Fundamental Duties of
Citizens in the Philosophical Tradition.

There is

a persistent strand of thought in Western
political philosophy that holds that citizens owe
fundamental duties to each other and to the state.
Certainly such a view is implicit in the social
contract theory of John Locke which holds that a
person who consents to be part of the social
community not only receives the benefits of
belonging to such a community but also incurs the
obligation of following the will of the majority
of the community -- unless that will requires
unjustifiable incursions into the life, liberty or
property of the individual.

No doubt this view

reflects principles of the common law of contract
which insists on a duty or obligation for each
reciprocal right.
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Some political philosophers, in a tradition
that can be traced back to Aristotle, argue that
the duties of citizens extend beyond simple
obedience; in this “republican” tradition,
citizens may also have an obligation to pursue
political virtue, preferring the common good over
personal gain and seeking to achieve the common
good through active participation in political
affairs.
Among modern writers, the political
philosophy of John Rawls posits strong duties or
obligations of citizen.

Not only is the citizen

bound by political obligations that have been
expressly undertaken -- the citizen may also be
bound by obligations to which he or she has not
expressly consented.

If the citizen finds himself

or herself in a society that is generally guided
by principles of justice that would be arrived at
by representative persons in the “original
position” behind the veil of ignorance (and if he
or she participates in the benefits of that
society), the citizen has an obligation to follow
the constitutional and statutory rules so derived.
Indeed, Rawls asserts that such a strong
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fundamental duty would itself be adopted by
persons in the “original position”.

Only when the

political institutions vary from the principles of
justice in some fundamental way is civil
disobedience justified -- a general principle that
would also presumably be adopted by the
representative individuals in the original
position.
According to Rawls, the principles that
would be adopted by persons in the “original
position” should then form the basis of an actual
constitutional system.

Accordingly -- although I

do not believe Rawls says this explicitly -- the
constitutional duties of citizens derived from
principles adopted in the original position might
well ultimately find their way into the relevant
constitutional documents.

Indeed, since

constitutional documents are generally somewhat
more detailed and explicit than the general
philosophical principles that they are designed to
implement, it seems possible that Rawls might not
only countenance the inclusion of citizens’
constitutional duties of obedience in the
constitution of a republic, but he might also
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consider the inclusion of certain other
constitutional duties of citizens that might
generally strengthen the social solidarity
necessary for the success of the constitutional
enterprise.

Even though these fundamental duties

might limit the citizens’ liberty to some degree,
those fundamental duties might permissibly be
taken into account in determining the “greatest
possible” liberty required by Rawls’ first
principle of justice.
II. Express fundamental duties of citizens
in twentieth century constitutions.

These

reflections lead us to the question of whether it
might make sense to embody fundamental duties of
citizens in constitutional documents; and we could
begin this inquiry by asking whether duties of
citizens have ever been included in constitutions
in the past or today.
Of course the eighteenth century
Constitution of the United States -- which was
principally intended not to rule the conduct of
citizens, but rather to establish the federal
government and to impose limitations on the
government in favor of citizens -- does not
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expressly contain constitutional duties of
citizens.

But the drafters of certain twentieth

century constitutions were perhaps not so
confident that their societies possessed the
requisite degree of political and social
solidarity.

Moreover -- for various reasons --

these drafters may have held a broader view of the
authority of constitutions over citizens.
Accordingly, some twentieth century constitutions
have indeed included fundamental duties of
citizens (and/or persons) in express provisions in
the constitutional text.
A. Weimar Constitution (1919).

Among the

democratic constitutions of the twentieth century,
perhaps the leader in this respect was the German
Constitution of 1919 -- the famous and ill-fated
Weimar Constitution.
The Weimar Constitution was an eminent
example of a constitution drafted for a riven and
demoralized society and a large proportion of the
citizens retained an internal allegiance not to
the new German republic, but to the old monarchy
or to more ominous political ideas of the powerful
right wing.

The Social Democrats who bravely
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devised and supported this charter not only
included prolific provisions requiring social
welfare for German citizens, but also set forth a
significant number of duties or obligations of
citizenship.

Indeed, the second major portion of

the Weimar Constitution -- in effect its Bill of
Rights -- is entitled “Basic Rights and Basic
Duties of the Germans”.
The express duties of citizens in the Weimar
Constitution break down into three basic forms:
general duties of citizens to the state; duties
with respect to education and upbringing of
children; and duties relating to property.

In

addition, a few constitutional provisions impose
burdens directly on citizens and therefore might
be considered to impose a form of constitutional
“duty”, although the word itself is not employed
in these provisions.
Let us first examine the general duties of
citizens.

Article 163 declares that “every German

has, irrespective of his personal freedom, the
moral duty to employ his intellectual and physical
powers in a manner called for by the common good
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(das Wohl der Gesamtheit)”.1

Here the Weimar

Constitution goes beyond the duty of loyalty and
requires duties apparently drawn from the
Aristotelian tradition; yet the universal claims
of this provision are perhaps mitigated by the
fact that this is a “moral” obligation only.
Other sections, however, seem to repeat aspects of
this provision without that qualification: thus
all citizens are “obligated, in accordance with
the laws, to perform personal services for the
state and for the municipalities” (Art. 133), and
every German has a similar duty to undertake
certain forms of volunteer activity
(“ehrenamtliche Tätigkeiten) (Art. 132).2

On

the questions of education and upbringing, Article
120 says that the upbringing of children is the
“highest duty and natural right of parents...”,
and there appears to be a constitutional duty of
children to attend school up until the age of 18
(Art. 145).

1

Translations by the author.
The duties of citizens, moreover, cannot be
limited by claims of religious freedom (Art. 136
(1)).
2
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Perhaps the most influential of the
constitutional duties in the Weimar Constitution
relate to property.

The general statement of this

duty declares -- in a concise formulation -- that
“property imposes duties (Eigentum verpflichtet).
Its use should also serve the common good (Gemeine
Beste)”.

Art. 153 (3).

Even more specifically,

and rather startlingly, Article 155 (3) states:
“the working and exploitation of the land is a
duty of the landowner with respect to the
community.

The increase in the value of property,

arising without the investment of labor or capital
in the property, is to be made available for use
by the community.”
The Weimar Constitution also imposed certain
obligations directly on individuals.

Although the

term “duty” is not explicitly employed in these
provisions, any constitutional provision that
directly imposes a legal burden on individuals can
be seen as creating a constitutional “duty”.
Presumably for the purpose of protecting loyalty
as well as furthering social and political
solidarity, Article 109 (5) prohibits citizens
from accepting “titles or orders” from other
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countries3, and individuals are prohibited from
imposing a disadvantage on another person for
exercising the freedom of speech (Art. 118 (1)).
Certain obligations of the “ordinary” law are also
imposed upon individuals by the Constitution:
usury is constitutionally prohibited and any
“jural act” which violates “good morals” is void
as a constitutional matter (Art. 152 (2)).
B.

Constitution of India (1976 amendments).

Another important twentieth century constitution
that contains a prolific list of fundamental
duties -- as well as other provisions that impose
obligations directly on citizens -- is the
Constitution of India adopted in 1950 and amended
numerous times thereafter.

In 1976, the

Constitution was amended to insert Part IV-A
(Section 51-A) entitled “Fundamental Duties.”
Adopted as part of the wide-ranging forty-second
amendment, this provision was enacted under Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi’s emergency government, and
therefore it may well be considered to have been
3

Interestingly, a similar provision in Article 1
Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution applies only
against federal office holders, rather than
against citizens at large, and therefore seems
directed against a form of political bribery.
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of very dubious origin.

Nonetheless, the

“fundamental duties” of Article 51-A seem to have
become well accepted -- even after the end of the
“emergency” -- and an additional “fundamental
duty” was even adopted in 2002. Art. 51-A(k) (duty
of parent or guardian to provide opportunities for
children’s education).
A significant number of these “fundamental
duties” seem directed toward reinforcing some of
the basic principles of the original Indian
Constitution, such as the duties “to abide by the
Constitution and respect its ideals and
institutions;” “to cherish and follow the noble
ideals which inspired our national struggle for
freedom”; “to uphold and protect the sovereignty,
unity and integrity of India”; “to promote harmony
and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all
the people of India...”; and “to value and
preserve the rich heritage of our composite
culture.”

Art. 51-A (a)-(c), (e)-(f).

In sum, it

shall also be the duty of every citizen “to strive
towards excellence in all spheres of individual
and collective activity so that the nation
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constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and
achievement.”

Art. 51-A (j).

Not all of the Fundamental Duties achieve
such rhetorical extremes.

Rather more

specifically, it shall also be the duty of every
citizen of India “to defend the country and render
national service...” (Art. 51-A (d)).

Other

obligations include the duty “to protect and
improve the natural environment...” (Art. 51-A
(g)) and to “renounce practices derogatory to the
dignity of women” (Art. 51-A (e).
In addition to these largely hortatory
provisions, a number of other provisions impose
obligations on individuals which are considerably
more concrete.

Article 15 (2)(a), for example,

seems to grant access to places of public
accommodation without discrimination, thereby
apparently imposing a constitutional obligation
that is rather analogous to the statutory
obligation of restaurant and hotel keepers, etc.,
set forth in Title II of the American Civil Rights
Act of 1964.

Similarly Section 17 abolishes

“untouchability” -- a provision which also is
apparently intended to impose direct obligations
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of nondiscrimination on individuals and which
requires enforcement by statute.
Unlike the Weimar Constitution of 1919, the
Indian Constitution does confer on the Indian
Supreme Court broad powers of judicial review, and
these powers have been exercised -- in sometimes
breath-taking ways -- by the Supreme Court over
the intervening decades.

The fundamental duties

of Article 51-A -- like the directive principles
of state policy which immediately precede them -probably do not constitute directly enforceable
law.

On the other hand it does seem to be

acknowledged that the Fundamental Duties may ease
a finding of constitutionality for legislative
attempts to enforce these duties.
III.

Constitutional duties of citizens (or

persons) in the German Basic Law.

The Basic Law

of the Federal Republic of Germany is in many ways
(although of course not all) the successor of the
Weimar Constitution, but it excludes almost all of
the Fundamental Duties of the earlier document.
Nonetheless, not all of the duties have been
removed and it also seems that duties of citizens
can be teased out of certain other constitutional
12

provisions.

First, and most obviously, the Basic

Law of the Federal Republic of Germany repeats the
striking declaration in the Weimar Constitution
that “property imposes duties” (Eigentum
verpflichtet) (Art. 14 (2) GG)4.

Indeed the word

“Pflicht”, buried in the verb “verpflichtet” is
directly translated as “duty”.

This provision

proclaims an obligation of social solidarity
through which the most “propertied” individuals
within German society owe an obligation to the
less fortunate, a proposition that is obviously
related to the “social state” (social welfare)
provisions of the German Basic Law. (Arts. 20, 28
GG).

This idea is further developed in section

14(3) of the Basic Law which makes clear that
compensation for the expropriation of property
need not be calculated according to market value - but may be determined through a “just” balancing
of the interests of the property owner and the
general interests of society.

4

As a constitutional

The same section also requires, in a rephrasing
of the parallel provision in the Weimar
Constitution, that the use of property serve the
common good. The Basic Law also contains a
lightly revised version of the parental duty set
forth in the Weimar Constitution (Art. 6 (2) GG).
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matter, this conception seems to contrast sharply
with the view of the isolated individual
possessing the right of property against the
world, which seems to prevail in American
constitutional law.
A very striking example of this general
principle is presented in certain cases involving
property expropriations that arose after German
unification.

The Constitutional Court found that

the government must compensate certain former
property holders in Eastern Germany whose land had
been expropriated by the Soviet occupation regime
in 1945, but the Court went on to approve
compensation at an amount considerably below
market value.

An important justification for this

lower level of compensation was that, as the
Soviet Regime imposed extraordinary burdens on
all, it would be unfair for the property rights of
landowners to be compensated at full market value,
while many other victims of the Soviet Regime
could never be adequately compensated for physical
impairment, imprisonment, etc.

Accordingly, the

remaining rights of the landowners must be
diminished by a general social obligation to all.
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Perhaps even more important, the Basic Law
of the Federal Republic of Germany is a
constitution that requires the state to provide a
measure of social welfare to its citizens (Arts.
20, 28 GG).

One could say that whenever a

constitution imposes an obligation of this kind on
the government, it is also imposing an obligation
of social solidarity on its citizens -- an
obligation that is made concrete through the
taxing system.

Thus, an obligation on the state

to pay social welfare benefits to its citizens is
also an obligation on its citizens -- according to
their means, as funneled through the rules of
taxation -- to pay taxes to support those social
welfare obligations.

Thus, in constitutional

systems where social welfare is optional, the
citizens have no constitutional duty to pay taxes
to support it -- this obligation (if it exists) is
imposed by the parliament and not by the
constitution itself.

In a constitution like the

Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany,
however, this duty of the taxpayers is imposed by
the constitution itself.
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Finally, in German constitutional law, the
doctrine of the “third-party effect”
(Drittwirkung) can also be viewed as resulting in
the creation of certain constitutional duties of
individuals.

Under this doctrine (which bears

some relationship to the state action doctrine in
the United States) the Basic Rights, which have an
“objective” nature, apply not only against the
state but also “influence” the law applicable to
transactions or relationships among individuals.
Under this doctrine, the “influence” of the
constitution might prohibit an employer from
discharging an employee on the basis of the
employee’s political views.

Accordingly, a form

of a constitutional right is conferred on the
employee, but a constitutional obligation or duty
-- to retain the employee -- is also imposed on
the employer.

IV.

Constitutional duties of citizens or

persons in the Constitution of the United States.
And finally we come to the question of
whether -- notwithstanding their absence in the
text itself -- one also might find constitutional
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obligations of citizens or persons in the
Constitution of the United States.
It might be tempting to consider that the
treason clause of Article III, Section 3 imposes a
constitutional duty of loyalty on American
citizens, rather like the obligation of loyalty
resulting from the social contract in Locke, and
its variations elaborated by John Rawls.
Certainly the law of treason posits the citizen’s
obligation of loyalty to the government -- and the
cases make clear, for example, that a person who
is not a United States citizen (and therefore has
no duty of loyalty to the United States)
ordinarily cannot be convicted of treason.
Thus, the law of treason certainly imposes
an obligation of loyalty on the citizen -- but the
question is whether it is a constitutional
obligation.

Does the treason clause require

Congress to create a law of treason -- in which
case the clause can be seen as imposing a
constitutional duty of loyalty on citizens?

Or,

is this section merely a limitation on the
discretionary power that Congress would otherwise
have under the necessary and proper clause to
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enact a statute creating and defining the crime of
treason -- in which case the duty of loyalty is
created by Congress and not by the Constitution?
This question probably cannot be answered
from the text itself, which seems more than
ordinarily ambiguous on this point.

Suffice it to

say, in any case, that the law of treason seems to
be a relic of the past, as there has not been a
conviction for treason in the United States for
well over 50 years.

I believe that the most

recent prosecutions for treason in the United
States arose out of the events of World War II.
Since then, the role that the criminal offense of
treason has played in the American political
structure has been assumed by other offenses -such as espionage -- which are certainly within
Congress’s discretion to create or abolish.
But even though the existence of a
constitutional duty of loyalty in the treason
clause may be problematic, there is indeed one
relatively narrow area in which the Supreme Court
of the United States has found constitutional
duties in the interstices of American
constitutional doctrine -- although not clearly
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found in the constitutional text.

These

constitutional duties of individuals are created
by the Supreme Court in its cases on the state
action doctrine.

According to the basic view, the

Fourteenth Amendment binds the government only and
does not ordinarily impose limitations on citizens
or groups of citizens.

Yet, for interesting

historical reasons, the Supreme Court has found -albeit in a relatively small number of instances - that private individuals or groups are so
closely intertwined with the state, or are so
clearly engaging in state-like functions, that
they are likewise subject to the strictures and
limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment.

So, for

this purpose, these individuals or groups are seen
to be exercising the power of the state and are
subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Yet, the reality is that these individuals
or groups remain individuals or groups -- they are
in reality not converted into the state.

Yet,

when the state action doctrine imposes the
limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment on these
individuals or groups, it is imposing
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constitutional duties upon them.

Thus, the Gulf

Shipbuilding Company has the constitutional duty
to permit Mrs. Marsh to come onto its property for
the purpose of distributing religious pamphlets5,
and the Logan Valley Plaza had the constitutional
duty -- until the case was later overruled -- to
allow the picketers of the AFGU to come upon its
land.6

The Jaybird Democratic Association of Fort

Bend County, Texas had the constitutional duty
(through the Fifteenth Amendment) to refrain from
discriminating on the basis of race in its “straw
poll,”7 and the Eagle Coffee Shop (located in a
building owned by the Wilmington Parking
Authority) had a similar constitutional obligation
to refrain from excluding people from its premises

5

March v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

6

AFEU v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
Even after Logan Valley was overruled, the
PruneYard Shopping Center had the constitutional
obligation -- under the California Constitution -to allow protestors to spread their message at
certain sites within the mall. PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
7

Terry v. Adams 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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on the bases of race.8

Moreover, of course, the

Thirteenth Amendment which is generally
acknowledged to apply against private individuals
and groups as well as against the state and
federal governments, has also created a federal
constitutional duty of individuals not to enslave
others.

With perhaps only a little exaggeration

one could say that the constitutional duty of the
Thirteenth Amendment is a duty of citizens to
treat all other citizens as citizens.
5.

Conclusion.

Unlike the laconic

eighteenth century Constitution of the United
States, certain twentieth century constitutions
contain express constitutional duties of citizens
or other individuals.

Indeed, implied

constitutional duties may even be found in the
United States Constitution, which seems to focus
almost exclusively on the state -- rather than on
providing rules for society.

But, in any case,

whenever a constitution turns its focus away from
exclusive concern with the structure of the state
and turns its attention to providing rules for

8

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715 (1961).
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various aspects of society -- or when it requires
the state to take certain actions on behalf of
members of society -- the constitution is most
likely not only creating rights for certain groups
and individuals in society; it is almost certainly
also creating reciprocal constitutional duties or
obligations which are to be imposed on citizens
and certain other individuals.
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